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Workers have responded differently to declining union density in the US and UK. US workers have
unfilled demand for unions whereas many UK workers free-ride at unionized workplaces. To explain
this difference, we create a scalar measure of worker needs for representation and relate desire for
unionism to this measure and to the choices that the US and UK labor relations systems offer
workers. Our measure of needs has similar properties across countries and is the single most
important determinant of worker desire for unions and collective representation. Conditional on
needs, we find that in both countries workers are more favourable to unions when management is
positive toward unions, but also favor them when management strongly opposes unionism, compared
to management having a neutral view. Much of the difference in the response of US and UK workers
to declining unionism appears to be due to the different institutional arrangements for voice that the
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   Membership in trade unions has fallen in the US and UK, creating a potential gap between 
the representation and participation workers want and the voice they get at their workplace. 
Workers have responded to declining unionization in the two countries differently.   In the US a 
large proportion of non-union workers want union representation, which they cannot obtain.  In the 
UK a large proportion of workers free ride at sites where employers recognize unions. 
  What explains the difference in worker responses to falling unionism in the two countries?  
Do UK and US workers respond differently because they have different needs for representation or 
because the two countries offer different menus of options to meet those needs? 
  We use data from the US’s Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (Freeman 
and Rogers, 1999) and the comparable British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey 
(Diamond and Freeman, 2002), and from the UK’s Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(Cully et al., 1999) to examine these questions.
1  We generate a single scalar variable – needs for 
representation – to measure the likely factors that lead workers to seek collective voice and examine 
its determinants and relation to the desire for union representation.   We find that the distributions of 
workers’ perceived needs for representation are similar in the two countries and are the chief 
determinant of desire for union representation.  We attribute US-UK differences in worker desires 
for different forms of voice to differences in the institutional choices on offer in the countries rather 
than to differences in needs or in attitudes toward collective or individual solutions to problems.   
Unionisation and worker attitudes  
  To begin with, union density has fallen in both countries. Density in the US fell from the 
mid-1950s through the mid-2000s to reach 12.5% overall and 7.9% in the private sector in 2005 
despite the organization of public sector workers in the 1960s (BLS, 2006). Density in the UK rose 
in the 1970s and then fell in the 1980s and 1990s, largely in the private sector, before stabilizing at 
29% of all employees and 17% of employees in the private sector in 2005 (Grainger, 2006).   
                                                            
1 These data sets are described in Appendix A. 
   2 
The US response to declining union density shows up in high levels of unfilled demand for 
unionism. The standard measure of unfilled demand is the proportion of non-union workers who 
say they would vote for a union in an NLRB representation election.  Freeman and Rogers’ WRPS 
found that 32% of non-union workers in private sector workplaces with over 25 employees would 
vote for union representation but did not have it in 1994-95.  Lipset and Meltz’s Angus Reid survey 
reported that 16% of US workers would definitely vote union and that 32% would probably vote 
union, giving 48% support for unionism, in 1996.
2   More recent data from Peter D. Hart Research 
Associates shows a rising trend in the proportion of workers who say they would vote in an NLRB 
election from 1993 to 2005 (Figure 1) to exceed 50% in 2003 and 2005.
3 The upward trend runs 
against explanations of declining union density in terms of falling worker interest in unions.
4   
  As for the UK, the BWRPS asked workers at workplaces without union recognition the 
likely effect a union would have on conditions at the site. Sixty six percent of respondents reported 
that they thought a union would not affect anything; while 22% thought the workplace would be 
better with unions and 13% thought it would be worse. The BWRPS also asked non-union workers 
in non-union workplaces: ‘If a group of workers at your workplace formed a union and asked you to 
join, how likely is it that you would join that union?’  Sixteen per cent said it was ‘very likely’ they 
would join, while 30 per cent said ‘quite likely’. If we define British workers wanting a union as 
those who report that they are ‘very likely’ to join and who believe a union would make their 
workplace better, just 10% of non-union employees in non-union UK workplaces would be 
                                                            
2  The unfilled demand for unionism in the US exceeds the comparably defined level in Canada and 
estimates of the desire for unions in other English-speaking countries. See Lipset and Meltz (2004) for 
Canada and Boxall, Freeman and Haynes (2006) for other countries 
3  A 2005 Zogby poll reported a lower rate of workers seeking unionism than the Hart survey: 35% 
would vote union (http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1011). This is below the 45%  
Zogby reported as wanting to join in 2004, but still higher than the WRPS estimate for 1995. 
4  Farber and Krueger (1992) argued that falling interest in unions contributed to the decline in density.  
If desire for unionisation is constant, declines in density should raise the proportion of non-organized 
workers who want unionism.  Since the percentage of non-union workers saying they would vote union 
was roughly constant in the period they examined, they attributed some of the decline to loss of interest 
in unions.  The Hart Poll increase in the proportion saying they would vote union runs against this story.   3 
classified as wanting unionisation.
5  In fact, rather than joining unions when they can, British 
workers have increasingly chosen to free ride at workplaces with recognized unions.  
The end of the closed shop in the early 1990s gave British workers in unionised 
establishments the choice to join or not at unionised workplaces.   Figure 2 shows that the 
proportion that chose to free ride increased greatly from the 1980s to the 1990s.  The WERS 
establishment data shows a doubling in the rate of free riding from 1980 to 1998.  The British 
Social Attitudes Survey shows a large rise in free riding from 1983-85 to 1999-2001. Shift-share 
analysis suggests that around 10 percentage points of the 12–13 percentage point decline in mean 
union density in unionised workplaces between 1990 and 1998  is due to “a reduced propensity 
among employees to join trade unions, even when encouraged to do so [by management]” 
(Millward et al. 2000: 149–151).
6    British trades unions refer to the problem of enlisting workers 
in organized workplaces as the “in-fill problem” since it involves filling membership at sites where 
the employer recognizes the union and may even encourage workers to join.
7 
The free rider behaviour of UK workers exceeds that of US workers in right to work states, 
where workers can choose to free ride as well but where 90% join the union (Farber and Western, 
2000).  As Figure 2 shows, 9 per cent of covered workers in the US were non-members in 2005, 
declining marginally since the early 1980s due to a fall in free-riding in the public sector.  
Workplace Needs or Problems as  Determinants of What Workers Want   
To understand why American workers have huge unfilled demand for unionism while 
British workers increasingly free ride at workplaces where the firm recognizes unions, we analyze 
                                                            
5 The 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey asked nonunion workers at nonunion workplaces if there 
were a trade union at the workplace the likelihood they would join: 15 per cent said they would be 
‘very likely’ to join, and 24 per cent said ‘quite likely’.   
6 Management respondents attributed declining union membership in their workplace during the 1990s 
mainly to a decline in employee support for their union (Millward et al., 2000: 92). Blanchflower (2006) 
presents European Social Survey 2002/2003 data that British workers are among those in Europe least 
likely to agree that “Employees need strong trade unions to protect their working conditions and wages”. 
7 Consistent with this, BSAS data for 1983-2002 show that among workers in unionized workplaces the 
probability of having once been a member and no longer one rose from 15-17 per cent of the ' ever-
member'  pool through 1993 to 21-22 per cent since 1995.    4 
how workplace problems affect worker desires for collective voice.  We assume at the outset that 
labor problems arise naturally at all workplaces.  Management makes errors, workers and 
management differ in information and perspectives and disagree about the division of rewards.  
Some of the problems are collective in nature and may impel workers to look to unions or other 
employee groups for resolution.  Other problems are individual, which affect workers singly and 
which are less likely to lead them to look for collective solutions.  
  All the micro-data sets we examine asked employees about particular problems at their 
workplace and about their workplace’s general climate.  The WRPS and BWRPS also asked about 
the influence workers had and wanted in different workplace decisions, and the grades workers give 
to management in dealing with workplace issues. To compare the reported needs across different 
questions and surveys, we developed a NEEDS scalar measure, using a scale from 0 to 1.  We 
coded responses to questions relating to needs for representation as 0/1 variables, where 0 means no 
problem/need and 1 means a problem/need.  We then summed these measures to obtain the total 
number of needs and divided the sum by the total number of questions, to obtain the fraction of 
needs reported, relative to the maximum possible in the survey. This approach facilitates 
comparisons of the reported needs across the different questions and surveys.  
  We illustrate how we measure needs with the BWRPS.  The influence questions asked how 
much influence workers wanted in an area and how much influence they had.  We coded workers as 
having a problem when they said they wanted a lot of influence in an area and did not have it.  
British workers had problems in determining pay raises and perks and bonuses – traditional trade 
union domains (Diamond and Freeman, 2002). The grade question on the BWRPS asked workers to 
grade management with a school grade scale from A to F.  We coded D/F grades as a 1 for problem 
or need.  Few British workers give management D/F on understanding and knowledge of the 
business but a sizeable number gave them those grades in granting pay increases, sharing authority, 
and making work interesting.  On the questions about unfair practices, the most common unfair 
practice was preferential treatment by management or senior staff; the second most common was   5 
payment of unfair wages; followed by unfair dismissal and discipline and bullying; discrimination 
was the least cited problem. Thirty-nine percent of workers cited at least one unfair practice as 
being a problem at their current workplace.  We counted responses to questions about general 
workplace climate, such as trust in management, security of employment, pleasantness of jobs, and 
employee management relations as a problem only when workers reported it as particularly bad. 
  In sum, we used 26 different BWRPS items to measure problems at workplaces.  Because 
the survey had a split sample design, however, some items were asked of only half of respondents, 
so that we have observations for each individual on only 23 items.  We then divided the number of 
needs by 23, so that the NEEDS variable can vary from zero (no problems reported) through 1.0 
(worker reports problems for every item they answered on the survey). 
  We followed a similar strategy in analyzing the 13 different WERS questions on 
problems/needs at the workplace.  We coded responses 1 if workers reported a problem or were 
dissatisfied with their situation and zero otherwise.  We then summed the responses and divided by 
13 to form a single scale of workplace needs.  The WERS scale takes the value 0 when workers 
report no problems and 1 when they report the maximum number of problems. 
  Turning to the US, the WRPS asked employees about employee needs for representation or 
participation in terms of the influence workers had in workplace decisions and the influence they 
wanted in those decisions.  The difference between the influence workers had and the influence they 
wanted is Freeman and Rogers’ (1999) representation and participation gap.  When workers said 
that they wanted "a lot" of influence in an area and also said that they did not have “a lot” of 
influence, we counted this as 1, indicating a need or problem in the area.  The survey also asked 
about general workplace climate, trust in management, security of employment, pleasantness of 
jobs, and employee management relations, etc. We coded responses to each relevant question as 1 if 
the worker had a need/problem and 0 otherwise. Given the split sample design of the survey, each 
worker on the WRPS answered 13 questions about needs.  From these data, we constructed a needs 
measure that varied from zero (no needs) to 1 (all 13 items coded as 1 in terms of needs).   6 
  In sum, for all of our data sets we computed a new variable Workplace Needs, which we 
treat as the primitive factor likely to create desire for collective voice. 
8  
The distribution of needs   
  Figure 3 graphs the distribution of the Workplace Needs variables from the surveys. All of 
the distributions have the same shape.  The mode occurs at zero needs/problems and the proportion 
of workers reporting positive numbers of needs declines nearly monotonically.  Panel A shows that 
in the BWRPS 23% of workers reported no needs or problems; 54% reported problems on less than 
three of the items, while just 23% reported problems on three or more items. As a result of this 
concentration, 10% of workers accounted for 52% of all the reported problems/needs. Panel B 
shows a comparable bunching of responses at zero followed by a declining proportion reporting 
higher numbers in the WERS.  Finally, Panel C for the US WRPS also shows that thirty-two 
percent of workers report no problems while 74% report problems on less than three items.   
  The figure gives the mean and variance for the scalar measure of needs for each survey. The 
mean and variance of needs are as follows: WRPS 0.134 and 0.022; BWRPS 0.156 and 0.030; 
WERS 0.211 and 0.057.  All three distributions diverge from the distribution of needs/problems that 
would be generated by a binomial distribution in which a worker had an independent random 
chance of reporting a problem on an item at the average rate reported in the sample. In the binomial 
case, there would only be a small mass at zero needs/problems, and the distribution would look 
more or less normal around the average rate.  The variance of the distribution would be (1-P) P, 
where P is the fraction of responses that reported a workplace need, and.  Instead, the distribution is 
shaped like a power law or exponential,
9 and the variances are much larger than those from a 
                                                            
8  Appendix B gives the questions and decision rule for each measure.  An alternative approach is to 
use the full information in the distribution of responses on each question so that the additive scale 
weights responses according to how much of a problem it was.  Using a simple scale with 1 to 
reflect the lowest possible response to problems/needs, 2 to reflect the next level, and so on, we 
formed a summated rating of these responses and obtained results that parallel those in the paper.  
9  We regressed ln (the % reporting number of needs) on the number of needs to fit an exponential 
distribution and regressed ln (the % reporting number of needs) on ln (the number of needs) to fit a   7 
binomial distribution. The reason the distribution takes on the non-normal shape is simple: the 
needs of workers on different items are not independent.  Knowing that a worker reports needs on 
any item gives information about their likelihood of reporting needs on other items.   
  There are two possible reasons for the non-independence of the reports of needs. One 
possibility is that it reflects workers’ personal characteristics.  A given worker may see more 
problems or get into more problems than others.  In this case, the individual nature of needs is 
unlikely to translate into a collective response.  The other possibility is that the non-independence 
reflects attributes of the workplace, which most workers would report.  One workplace would 
generate many problems while another would not.  The former would likely produce a general 
desire for representation at a workplace, while the latter would not   
The BWRPS and WRPS surveys do not allow us to identify the workplace component of 
needs, since they do not identify workers at the same workplace.  Nor do they permit identification 
of the individual component of needs since they do not follow workers from one workplace to 
another.  But the WERS sample design allows us to identify the workplace component because it 
surveyed up to 25 employees at each of the sampled workplaces.  Where the workplace had 25 or 
fewer workers, all employees were selected.  In larger workplaces 25 workers were drawn randomly 
for the employee survey.  The result is a data file that contains reports by different workers in the 
same workplace – the information necessary to identify a fixed workplace effect in needs.    
Needs at the same workplace 
  Accordingly, we created a data file from WERS that gave the number of needs reported by 
25,451 employees at 1,759 workplaces.  This gave us an average of 14.5 worker reports on needs 
per workplace.  We tabulated the needs reported by workers for each workplace and ranked the 
workplaces by average needs. This tabulation shows that workplaces in the upper ten percent of the 
distribution of needs averaged 6.23 needs on the WERS scale from 0 to 13 – giving it a needs scale 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
power law.  The exponential fits the BWRPS and WRPS better than a power law, whereas the power 
law fits better for the WERS.   8 
measure of 0.48 -- whereas workplaces in the lower ten percent of the distribution of needs 
averaged 0.74 needs for a scalar measure of 0.06.
10  Such wide variation by workplace makes a 
prima facie case that the differing labor situations at workplaces are a key factor for worker reports 
of problems or needs.  We also compared the variance in needs explained by individuals’ 
demographic and job characteristics with the variance explained by workplace fixed effects. As 
table 1 shows, the R
2 is around 0.2 in models containing only workplace fixed effects and 0.1 in 
models containing individual and job characteristics.  When the two are combined the R
2 rises to 
around 0.25 and the workplace fixed effects remain jointly highly significant.   
  These data thus show that workers at a given workplace report sufficiently similar numbers 
of needs to identify “good” and “bad” workplaces, which in turn suggests that workers who report 
lots of needs are likely to seek some form of representation to redress workplace problems. 
Determinants of needs 
 In addition to workplace factors, the demographic and economic characteristics of workers 
affect the number of needs that they report.  To analyze these patterns, we estimated regression 
equations linking needs to characteristics, union membership, and selected management human 
resource (HR) policies in the US WRPS and UK BWRPS.  Table 2 gives the regression coefficients 
and t-statistics for estimates of the effect of HR policies and management attitudes toward unions 
for all workers (column 1-2), for non-union members (column 3-4) and for union members (column 
5-6).  The regression models include extensive control variables as listed in the notes to the table.
11  
The coefficients on variables in table 2 for the two countries are qualitatively similar, 
suggesting that the same labor policies affect workers in the same manner, albeit with different 
magnitudes.  Consider first the positive estimated coefficients on union members in columns 1 and 
2: these estimates indicate that, all else the same, union members report more needs than non-
                                                            
10 Alternatively, needs averaged 1.25 at the 10
th percentile and 5.09 at the 90
th percentile. 
11  The control variables show that the strongest relations are for workplace factors. The number of 
workers in an organization and workplace are positively correlated with needs. In addition, workers 
with greater job tenure have higher needs than newer workers, white collar workers have fewer 
needs, while most other factors have modest effects on needs.    9 
members, potentially because unions seek out problems for resolution, through the voice 
mechanism (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  The next set of variables are human resource 
management policies measured as dichotomous variables: either the firm has a policy or it does not.  
Presence of policies reduces the number of needs substantially.  An open door management system 
has a massive impact on needs, followed by the presence of worker committees – employee 
involvement committees in the US and joint consultative committees in the UK.  Most of the other 
policy measures also reduce the number of needs, though the presence of grievance procedures in 
the UK raises the number of needs.  The coefficients on these variables in columns 3-6 for non-
union members and members show that the policies have generally similar effects for the two 
groups.
12     
The coefficients on the variables “management opposed to unions” and “management 
favorable to unions” show the impact of those attitudes, as reported by workers, compared to the 
reference group, where the worker judges management as indifferent or with policies the respondent 
does not know.  Management opposition to unionism is associated with more needs, suggesting that 
this stance may reflect a harsh policy toward worker concerns.  By contrast, management in favour 
of unions has a negative but non-significant effect on needs in the US and a substantial negative 
effect in the UK.  The regressions for non-members and members in columns 3-6 show that the 
reduction in needs in UK firms where managements are favorable to unions occurs solely in 
organized workplaces.  
Because the regressions are sufficiently similar in the two countries, we ran a regression for 
the pooled country data. In this pooled regression the dummy variable on the US is negative and 
significant for all workers, and for non-members and members. The implication is that conditional 
on all other factors, the major difference between the US and UK is that American workers have 
lower needs.  This means that the greater desire of US non-union workers than of UK non-union 
workers for unions cannot be attributed to needs.  To explain this difference in what workers want 
                                                            
12  The exceptions are profit-related pay, which has a negative effect on non-members’ needs but a positive effect on 
members’, and grievance procedures for the US which is negative for nonmembers but positive for members.   10 
in the two countries, we turn to differences in the institutions for collective voice that the two 
countries offer workers.  
 
Determinants of What Workers Want: Institutions On Offer 
  The second part of our analysis links worker desire for unions/other forms of collective 
voice to the voice options available to workers.  Firms affect what is available by offering non- 
union channels of voice and by responding positively or negatively to worker efforts to form unions 
or other independent organizations.  Unions affect what is available by delivering services to 
members at organized workplaces and by campaigning to organize workers in sites that do not have 
union representation/recognition.  The state affects what is available by legal enactment and 
enforcement of labor laws.  Our analysis takes the institutions on offer from employers, unions, and 
the state as exogenous, and thus falls short of a complete model of a labor relations system that 
would treat the decisions of employers, unions, and the state to offer those choices as endogenous.  
We begin by considering the attributes of institutions that workers want to deal with their problems 
and then turn to their preferences among the institutions on offer. 
Workplace institutions to solve problems 
  The WRPS and BWRPS asked workers several questions about the types of workplace 
organizations they wanted to deal with problems.  They asked if workers wanted groups of workers 
for support on workplace issues or if they preferred to deal with problems on their own.  They asked 
about the relation they wanted any worker-based organization to have with management.  The 
surveys have similar findings.  Most workers wanted some form of organization to deal with 
collective goods problems at workplaces; and most wanted employee-based organizations that work 
cooperatively with management as opposed to those involved in continual conflict with 
management. 
  Table 3 presents the evidence for these conclusions. Panel A shows that a majority of 
workers in both the US and UK prefer collective solutions for problems likely to affect the entire   11 
work force: benefits and health and safety issues in the US case; and salary and workplace 
conditions in the UK case.  By contrast, a majority of workers in both countries prefer to deal with 
career development issues by themselves: training in the US case and training and promotion in the 
UK case.  Where US and UK workers differ is in how they want to deal with problems of protection 
against bad treatment at the workplace.  US workers prefer to deal with unfair treatment or 
harassment by themselves, possibly because US employment law provides considerable legal rights 
to workers who face discrimination at the workplace, while UK workers prefer to have the help of 
fellow employees with these sorts of problems. 
   Panel B shows that workers in both countries prefer worker organizations with which 
management cooperates to organizations that conflict with management.  The majority of US 
employees would choose a workplace organization with no power but with which management 
cooperates to an organization with power but which management opposes. The reason is that the 
majority believe that an employee organization cannot be effective without cooperation. Similarly, 
UK workers prefer an organization that “work(s) with management to improve the workplace and 
working conditions” to an organization that declares its main function as “defend(ing) workers 
against unfair treatment by management.”  They prefer this even though most union members 
regard defending workers against unfair treatment to be one of the principal goals of their union 
(Bryson, 2005).
13     
  Given that workers in the US and UK report similar needs/problems at their workplaces and 
have similar preferences for dealing with workplace needs with the help of employees and through 
worker organizations that have cooperative relations with management, why do US workers have 
such a large unfilled demand for unions while UK workers increasingly free ride at workplaces with 
recognized unions?   
                                                            
13One reason for the desire for cooperative relations is that the number of workplace problems falls when 
management and unions work cooperatively (Bryson and Freeman, 2006).    12 
  We consider next three factors likely to affect the differential response of US workers and 
UK workers to falling unionization.  
Difference in Management Policies toward Unions and Voice 
 
  Since union premiums shift profits from shareholders to workers, it is natural for firms to 
seek to oppose unionism and to offer voice solutions that may substitute for unions.  
  Management opposition to unionisation is stronger in the US than in the UK.  For the US, 
the WRPS finds that 53% of managers in non-union firms say they would oppose efforts by 
employees to unionise, 27% said they wouldn’t care, and 15% said they would welcome the effort 
(Freeman and Rogers, 1999).  Many labor-management consulting firms specialize in helping 
business maintain a “union-free environment” (Logan, 2002).  By contrast, in the UK, most 
employers are neutral towards unions: 65% of non-unionised private sector employers in WERS 
1998 expressed neutrality about union membership among its employees, 30% expressed 
opposition and 5% were favourable (Bryson, et al., 2004).
14  An obvious reason for this difference 
in management attitudes is that the US union wage premium is among the highest in the world, 
whereas the UK premium is modest. 
  At the same time management in both countries have developed positive labor relations in 
the form of modern human resource programs that arguably could substitute for unionism.  In the 
US Section 8(a)(2) of the US’s National Labor Relations Act outlaws company sponsored systems 
of collective voice as company unions designed to undermine workers setting up their own 
organization, and thus limits management ability to develop such substitutes (LeRoy, 2006).  By 
contrast the UK’s historically voluntaristic labour-management system makes it easier to develop 
alternatives to unionism.  
Differences in the Legal Choice Set 
                                                            
14Managers were asked: ‘How would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union 
membership among employees at this establishment?  Is management...in favour of trade union 
membership, not in favour of it, or neutral about it?’   13 
  The UK and the US offer workers and management different choice sets for worker 
representation and participation.  In addition to unions, the UK offers a range of workplace 
institutions including employer sponsored workplace committees.  It has added works councils 
under the EU Social Charter.  Lay representatives deliver union services at workplaces. Managerial 
employees as well as those without supervisory roles often join unions.
15 At the end of the 1980s the 
Conservative government removed legal protections from the closed shop, which allowed for the 
large increase in free riding.  At the end of the 1990s, the Labour government introduced elections 
for union status when firms refused to recognize employees seeking union status, but this has been 
used infrequently. 
  The US’s National Labor Relations Act offers a narrow range of choices for workers in the 
private sector.  In principle US law protects minority unionism, but the de facto choice has been 
between a collective bargaining majority union and no worker organization.  By posing the choice 
of workplace labor institutions as 0/1 union/no union, the US system stokes employer opposition to 
unionism and encourages firms to develop policies for individual voice, but not for collective voice.  
Differences in Union Effectiveness 
  Another potential reason for the differing attitude of US workers and UK workers to the 
decline of union representation is that union effectiveness differs.  The higher union wage premium 
in the US than in the UK (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003, 2004) suggests that unions are more 
effective in delivering “monopoly” gains to members in the US.  Whereas the US union wage 
differential remains one of the highest in the world, WERS data suggests that UK unions’ efficacy 
has declined over the past two decades or so.  Even where unions are recognised by employers for 
negotiation purposes, collective bargaining coverage has declined  (Millward et al., 2000: 159-167), 
leading some commentators to the ‘inescapable conclusion that workplace trade unions no longer 
                                                            
15 In 2005 19% of managers and senior officials were unionised (Grainger, 2005).    14 
negotiate to any significant extent on behalf of their members’ (Terry, 2004: 205).
16  Neither the 
WRPS nor the BWRPS ask workers in non-union workplaces about their assessment of the 
effectiveness of unions (on the assumption that workers in non-unionized workplaces would have 
limited or no knowledge of union effectiveness in unionized sites).  Both do ask workers in 
unionised workplaces about the perceived effectiveness of unions and preferences for union 
representation.   
In the WRPS data, 31% of US union members report that they are very satisfied with union 
bargaining over wages and benefits, while in the BWRPS, just 11% of union members give their 
union a high grade for ‘winning fair pay increases and bonuses’.
17 But delivering on wages and 
benefits is not the sole purpose of unions. The WRPS shows that 30% of members thought unions 
were ‘very effective’ in resolving group problems or concerns, while a further 53% thought they 
were ‘somewhat effective’.   Thirty-five percent of union members rated their union high in 
choosing local leaders democratically compared to 17% who rated their union low.  The figures 
from analogous questions for the UK show lower assessments of effectiveness.  In the BWRPS UK 
workers gave unions a mixed rating, giving them lower grades than management in making 
workplaces better in some areas (Diamond and Freeman, 2002). Only 17% rated their union high in 
being open and accountable to its members and only 15% rated their union high in sharing 
information.   The structural features of unions (high density, on-site union representatives etc.) that 
are associated with perceptions of high union effectiveness are not widespread throughout the union 
sector (Bryson, 2005).
18  In short, the evidence and responses of workers to questions about union 
                                                            
16On the other hand, time-series data show that a fairly constant two-thirds of unionised employees 
believe that ‘unions do their job well’ over the period 1983-2001 (Bryson and Gomez, 2002). 
17 The BWRPS asked British workers to grade their union on various dimensions; we coded A as 
high and D/F as low. The US survey asked if workers were very satisfied, satisfied, not too satisfied 
or not at all satisfied in an area; we coded very satisfied as high and not too or not satisfied as low. 
18 Supporting the notion that some of the problems faced by UK unions are associated with their 
lack of efficacy, Bryson and Freeman (2006) find that perceived union effectiveness is associated 
with fewer expressed needs and that workers are more likely to choose unions when they believe 
unions “make a difference to what it is like to work here” and “take notice of members’ problems 
and complaints”.    15 
effectiveness suggest that US unions are more effective than UK unions in delivering benefits to 
members and in accountability to them.
19 
Where US unions have been ineffective is in organizing the millions of workers who seek 
union representation in the face of company opposition. Organizing in the US has become 
extremely expensive, as unions and management pour resources into NLRB election campaigns.  
Farber and Western (2001) and Freeman and Rogers (1999) estimate that unions would have to 
devote the bulk of their budgets just to organize enough workers to maintain their present density 
with current organizing techniques and effectiveness.  It is only outside the standard collective 
bargaining framework that unions have managed to enlist members at low cost, either through card 
checks
20 or through organizing workers into non-collective bargaining groups.  In arguably the most 
successful such activity in 2005 the AFL-CIO sent organizers into ten cities to ask people to join a 
non-collective bargaining AFL-CIO affiliate, Working America (www.workingamerica.org). The 
organizers signed up 1,200,000 members by early 2006.  This is the strongest evidence we have that 
the survey findings that millions of non-union workers want to join a union reflects genuine 
attitudes, not simply casual responses to a survey.  
But UK unions do not seem to be any more effective in organizing workers than US unions.  
Unions in the UK face serious financial difficulties, partly due to declining density, but also to other 
factors (Willman and Bryson, 2005).  The weakness in organizing is illustrated by BWRPS 
evidence that over half (56%) of non-members eligible to join the union at their workplace say they 
have never been asked to join by the union.  Since 10% of non-members in unionised workplaces 
say they would be ‘very likely’ to join if asked, and a further 26% say they would be ‘quite likely’ 
                                                            
19  Consistent with this, the positive coefficient of unionism on number of needs reported in columns 
1 and 2 of table 2 is larger in the UK than in the US.  
20 AFL-CIO national organizing director Stewart Acuff told the Wall Street Journal in August 2005 
that three times as many workers were added through "card checks" than through traditional secret 
ballot elections. And the Bureau of National Affairs reported in January 2006 that UNITE HERE 
president Bruce Raynor estimates that 90 percent of his new members had been organized through 
"alternative means" that avoided elections.  
   16 
to join, this is a significant missed opportunity which means demand for unionisation goes unmet.  
The removal of closed shop legislation in the early 1990s heightened the problem for unions, for it 
allowed employees in unionised workplaces to free-ride on union-provided services, making it 
critical that unions offer private excludable goods to workers to induce them to join (Bryson, 2006). 
Workers’ Choice of Workplace Institution 
  The WRPS and BWRPS surveys asked several questions about workers’ preferences for 
unions and other modes of representation and institutions of voice.   
  The WRPS asked US workers three questions relating to desire for unions.  It asked whether 
they would vote for a union in a representation election.  It also asked them to choose among three 
institutions to increase their say in workplace matters: unions (half of the sample) or an elected 
body of workers to bargain with management (the other half of the sample), joint employee 
management committees, or labor laws.  Finally, it asked them separately about the characteristics 
of any joint committee that they might prefer, including whether there should be recourse to an 
outside arbitrator, whether the organization should be employee-run or run jointly with 
management, and whether employees should elect representatives.    
  The BWRPS asked UK workers three questions on the desire for unions.  It asked whether 
they would support unions at their workplace or if their union was worth the dues they paid it; 
whether they thought unions would make the workplace better; and whether they would prefer to 
have only unions, only works councils, unions and works councils, or none of these forms at their 
workplace.  By asking several questions about desired workplace representation appropriate to the 
country setting, the surveys give a much richer picture of preferences for collective representation 
than simple “union – yes or no” questions.  But this design also complicates measurement of desire 
for unionism or other forms of representation and comparisons across the two countries, since the 
institutional options differ.  We combined the responses to the different questions to obtain an 
ordering of the desire for unionism that had values from 0 to 6 for the US and UK, where 0 
represents the least desire for unions and 6 represents the greatest desire for unions.     17 
  In both surveys we coded each of the three questions from 0 to 2 and formed summated 
ratings for the desire for collective representation. For the US, on the voting question, we scored a 2 
if workers said they would vote for a union in an NLRB election, scored 1 if they said they would 
switch their vote depending on employer attitudes and 0 if they would vote no.
21 Fifty-nine per cent 
of all employees in WRPS scored zero, 4% scored 1 and 37% scored 2 on this item.  On the desired 
organization question, we gave a 2 if they chose a union/employee organization that collectively 
bargained; a 1 if they chose a joint committee; and a 0 otherwise.  Twenty-six per cent favored 
collective bargaining and 58% chose a joint committee.  On the attributes of a workplace committee 
question, we gave a 2 if they preferred workers to vote for committee members, that the 
organization be employee run, and if they wanted an outside arbitrator to resolve disagreements; a 1 
if they chose 2 of these 3, and 0 otherwise.  Six per cent favored all three options, 39% favored two 
of the options.   For the UK, we gave a score of 2 to workers who thought unions made the 
workplace a lot better, a score of 1 if they thought unions make the workplace a little better, and 0 
otherwise.  On the likelihood of joining a union question, for non-union members we gave a score 
of 2 if they said very likely, a score of 1 if they said quite likely, and 0 otherwise; for union 
members we gave a score of 2 if they said membership was ‘good value for money’, a score of 1 if 
they said ‘reasonable value’ and 0 otherwise. Twenty-nine per cent said it represented ‘good value 
for money’. On the question regarding unions and works councils, we gave a score of 2 if they said 
they wanted a union (either on its own or with a works council), a score of 1 if they wanted a works 
council but no union, and zero otherwise.   Sixteen percent of non-union workers in non-union 
workplaces said they would be very likely to join a union at their workplace if one was formed, and 
an additional 29% said they were quite likely to join.  But just 19% of non union workers said the 
workplace would be a lot or a little better with a union. 
  Panel A of Table 4 shows the distribution of responses of non-union workers in the US and 
the UK on this 0-6 scale.  In the US, the mean value is 2.15, with one-fifth of non-members scoring 
                                                            
21 That is, when a worker said they would vote union only in the absence of employer opposition to a union, or said they 
would change a ‘no’ vote to a ‘yes’ if they thought management would not oppose the union, we coded this item ‘1’.   18 
4+ and 8% scoring zero.  In the UK, the mean score is 1.84, with one-sixth of non-union workers 
scoring 4+ and 26% scoring zero – over three times the percent for the US.   
  Panel B displays the scores for union members in the US and the UK.  The scores for the 
UK are more polarized than those for the US: UK members are more likely to score the maximum 6 
(15% against 6% in the US) and more likely to score below 3 (9% compared with 16% in the US).  
But the mean scores are similar for members in the two countries.  Very few members score zero. 
Panel C gives estimates of the proportion of workers in unionized settings in the US and UK 
who prefer non-union status.  For the UK this is the proportion of workers who report a union at 
their workplace that they could join but have not joined – free riders—35%.   For the US the 
estimate is the proportion of union members who said they would vote to remove the union in an 
NLRB decertification election.  As a percentage of union members this is 9%; as a percentage of all 
non-managerial employees in a unionised environment it is 18%.   
  In short, proportionately more non-union workers in the US than in the UK are favorably 
inclined to unions; whereas UK workers are more inclined than US workers to favor works 
councils. And the proportion of workers in unionized workplaces that free ride in the UK exceeds 
the proportion of unionized workers who would get rid of their local union in the US if they could.  
Determinants of Desire for Unions in Non union Workplaces 
   We seek to explain these patterns in terms of worker needs and the options that 
management, unions, and the legal system offer workers to meet these needs. We consider first the 
effect of needs, management attitudes toward unionism, and HR practices on the preferences toward 
unionism of workers in non-union workplaces.  For simplicity, in this analysis we measure HR 
practices by the number of policies at the workplace: this variable ranges from 0 to 6.
22  
Table 5 gives the regression coefficients and t-statistics on the estimated effects of specified 
factors from a linear probability model of the desire for union representation among workers in non-
union workplaces in the WRPS and BWRPS data sets.   We give estimates for models for the UK 
                                                            
22  Estimating the model with dummy variables for each policy, we found that they affected the desire for unionism with 
similar coefficients, which contrasts with the table 2 finding that open door policies reduced needs the most.   19 
and US separately and then for a pooled sample for the two countries.  The models for the US and 
UK give similar results. The desire for unions rises with needs, with a larger estimated coefficient 
for the US than for the UK.  The U-shaped effect of perceived management attitudes to unions is 
evident in both countries.  The substitution effect of the HRM count is only significant in the US, 
though the coefficient is also negatively signed in the UK. In the UK members in non-union 
workplaces express a strong desire for unionisation; the absence of union members in non-union 
workplaces in the US means this term falls out of the US equation.  The pooled regression shows 
desire for unions in the non-union sector is stronger in the US than the UK. 
Why is the relation between preference for a union and management opposition U-shaped in 
both countries?  It is reasonable that when an employer favors unions, workers would also be more 
favorable to them. The surprise is that workers also favor unions when management opposition is 
severe.  The most plausible interpretation of this result is that strong management opposition to 
unionism reflects a tough policy towards workers.  If this interpretation were correct, we would 
expect to find that workers with many needs and facing management opposition ought to be driving 
the relation between strong opposition and desire for unionism.  To test this, we divided the sample 
between workers in the upper third of the distribution of needs and the rest of the workers.  In the 
UK, management opposition increased the desire for collective representation only among non-
members in the top third of the needs distribution but in the USA, management opposition 
increased the desire for collective representation regardless of needs (see Appendix C).  
We also estimated a model for non-members in non-union workplaces on the WERS data 
file (Appendix D).  The WERS asked whether workers wanted unions to represent them for pay, 
grievance procedures, and making a complaint.   We measured the desire for union representation 
on a 0 to 3 scale depending on how many times a worker said they wanted representation.
23  As in 
table 5, we found that the needs variable had a great impact on workers wanting union 
representation, even in a fixed effects analysis that controlled for the workplace.  The WERS 
                                                            
23 WERS asks workers to identify who best represented them in relation to getting pay increases, making a complaint 
about working, and if management wanted to discipline the worker, with ‘trade union’ being one of four options.   20 
regressions show a positive relation between management communication policies and the desire 
for unions. Confirming the result in table 5, management support or opposition to unions gives the 
same U shaped relation that we found in the WRPS and BWRPS. 
The regressions in table 5 explain the differing attitudes of workers within the US and UK 
toward unions but the pooled regression shows that there is a substantial cross-country difference 
that remains: workers in non-union workplaces are more favourably inclined toward unions in the 
US than in the UK.  The estimated coefficient on the US dummy in the regression is a highly 
significant 0.339.   The mean value of the union desire variable for non-union workers in the US is 
2.15 while the mean value for the union desire variable for non-union workers in the UK is 1.84, 
which gives a slightly lower difference of 0.31.  The implication is that while the regressions 
explain the differences in desire for unionism within country, they do not explain the cross-country 
differential at all; rather they widen the estimated US-UK difference.   
How can we explain the cross-country difference in the desire for unionism?  Our analysis 
directs attention at the differing institutions on offer in the two countries and the resultant difference 
in union density.  US workers lack the intermediate institutions for voice that exist in the UK and 
face large difficulties in organizing so that many more non-union workers favor unions in the US 
than in the UK.  To test this explanation, we conducted a simulation analysis in which we estimated 
what the desire for unionism among non-union workers in the two countries would be if each 
country had the unionization rate of the other country.  The basic idea is that if more US (fewer UK) 
workers had union status, the difference in desire for unionism among non-union workers between 
the countries should be less.  We did this in a three step analysis.  First, we estimated equations that 
predict worker desire for unionism on our 0 to 6 scale, using the regression structure in table 5, but 
applying the model to all workers.  Second we ranked workers by their predicted desire for 
unionism. Third, we estimated what the mean desire on non-union workers would be if more 
workers were organized in the US or if fewer workers were unionized in the UK.  The key 
assumption in this calculation is that additional unionization would come from non-union workers   21 
with the highest desires for unionism or conversely, that reduced unionization would come from 
unionized workers with the least desire for unions. 
Table 6 gives the results of this analysis.  We estimate that if the US had the proportion of 
workers unionized in the UK sample (34%), the desire for unionism among non-union US workers 
would fall from 2.15 to 1.95 – a 0.20 drop that accounts for 65% of the 0.31 point gap between US 
and UK non-union workers.  Similarly, we estimate that if the UK had the proportion of workers 
unionized in the US sample (14%), the desire for unionism among UK workers would rise to 2.23 – 
a 0.39 increase that actually exceeds the US-UK gap.  One possible reason for the larger change in 
the difference in the desire for unionism is that the unionized workers in the UK who by our 
analysis would lose their union status have developed greater desire for unionism as a result of their 
experience with it (Bryson and Gomez, 2003).
24   
Determinants of Attitudes Toward Unions in Union Workplaces 
  What about the workers in organized workplaces choosing to free ride or otherwise reject 
unions?  Table 7 examines the attitudes of workers in union workplaces toward unions.  Column 1 
gives the estimated coefficients and t-statistics for the factors that lead a worker in the UK to free-
ride in a workplace where there is a union the worker could join.  Free-riding is lower when needs 
are higher, when workers think management favors the union and when they perceive unions as 
more effective.  HR policies do not affect the likelihood of free riding.  Column 2 examines the 
factors that lead a worker in a unionized workplace in the USA to favor decertifying the union.  
This is not the same as being a ‘free-rider’ but it is the best measure in the US of the desire of 
workers in an organized work place to reject unions.  The estimated coefficients on the variables 
have the same sign as in column 1 but are weaker in magnitude and significance.  Assessment of 
union effectiveness is the statistically strongest variable.   
  The remaining columns examine the determinants of the desire for unionism using our 0-6 
measure of the desire.  The coefficients on the variables have opposite signs to those in columns 1 
                                                            
24  We also estimated the model using the equations for non-union workers in table 5 and obtained comparable results.    22 
and 2, since they measure favourableness toward unions.  The coefficients on need and union 
effectiveness are larger and more significant in the UK than in the US. This reflects the fact that the 
UK sample includes the free riders, so the UK regression differentiates the desire for unions among 
members, who have greater needs and who see the union as more effective, from the desire of 
workers who have chosen to be non-members.  In the pooled regression, all of the variables except 
for the count of HR policies are statistically significant and parallel the results for workers in the 
non-union sector in table 5.  The dummy coefficient for the US is positive significant, as is the 
dummy coefficient for union members in the UK.  The group with the least desire for unionisation 
are non-members in the UK, who in fact are able to express their lack of desire through free-riding.   
Conclusions 
  This paper has compared the preferences of workers in the US and UK for unions and other 
forms of employee voice in a period of declining union density.  It shows that US workers have a 
high and seemingly increasing unfilled demand for unionism while a growing proportion of UK 
workers have chosen to free ride at unionized work places.  The key factor determining worker 
desire for unions or other forms of collective voice in both countries is the number of needs or 
problems that workers report.  Using the responses of multiple workers at the same workplace, we 
show that needs have a significant workplace component, but that even within the same workplace, 
workers who report greater needs/problems are more likely to favor unions.  The different choices 
on offer in the two countries appear to affect the different responses of UK and US workers to fairly 
similar workplace needs/problems.  The dichotomous choice between collective bargaining and no 
representation in the US produces a smaller rate of unionization in the US that manifests itself in 
greater unfilled demand for unions among non-union workers than in the UK; whereas the wider 
choice of voice institutions in the UK attracts many to take the free rider option.   23 
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model  .203  .107  .256 
r-sq unweighted 











N=25,451, 1,759 workplaces. 
Regressors in columns 2 and 3: female, union member, age (6 dummies), ethnicity, health problem, 
married or living as married, academic qualifications (6 dummies), vocational qualifications, 
occupation (9 dummies), tenure (4 dummies), hours (5 dummies), gender segregation on the job (5 
dummies), banded gross weekly wages (11 dummies), permanent contract. 
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Table 2: Regression estimates of determinants of needs (measured as scalar 








































Notes: all models contain the following controls – male, age (5 dummies), ethnicity, marital status, any children, 
education (4 dummies), hours worked (3 dummies), tenure with employer (4 dummies), occupation (8 dummies), 
if supervisor, banded earnings (12 dummies), organization with 1000+ employees, workplace size (5 dummies), 
industry (9 dummies)
  All workers  Non-members  Members 
  USA  UK  USA  UK  USA  UK 
Member  0.025  0.061  -  -  -  - 





           
Opposed  0.045  0.094  0.043  0.088  0.050  0.122 
  (6.63)**  (7.66)**  (6.10)**  (6.60)**  (2.00)*  (4.37)** 
In favour  -0.014  -0.040  -0.009  0.018  -0.012  -0.079 
  (0.92)  (3.49)**  (0.50)  (1.13)  (0.31)  (4.52)** 
Substitutes:             
Open door  -0.103  -0.059  -0.102  -0.060  -0.119  -0.048 
  (12.34)**  (6.45)**  (11.35)**  (5.47)**  (4.67)**  (2.76)** 
Committee  -0.038  -0.033  -0.041  -0.019  -0.023  -0.058 
  (5.81)**  (3.51)**  (5.89)**  (1.77)  (1.09)  (3.16)** 
Profit-related 
pay 
-0.010  -0.017  -0.017  -0.021  0.029  0.002 
  (1.33)  (1.56)  (2.23)*  (1.67)  (1.03)  (0.09) 
ESOP  -0.018  -0.008  -0.016  -0.019  -0.033  -0.024 
  (2.22)*  (0.52)  (1.82)  (0.94)  (1.29)  (0.82) 
Performance 
pay 
-0.016  -0.018  -0.013  -0.023  -0.047  -0.010 
  (2.18)*  (1.64)  (1.64)  (1.86)  (1.74)  (0.45) 
HR 
department 
0.006  -0.000  0.003  -0.004  0.018  -0.001 
  (0.81)  (0.01)  (0.37)  (0.29)  (0.67)  (0.06) 
Grievance 
Procedure 
-0.011  0.021  -0.016  0.019  0.024  0.020 
  (1.50)  (2.17)*  (2.00)*  (1.52)  (0.89)  (1.12) 
Constant  0.220  0.218  0.227  0.204  0.121  0.260 
  (9.47)**  (6.26)**  (9.08)**  (4.92)**  (1.41)  (3.89)** 
Observations  2049  1355  1767  889  282  466 
R-squared  0.20  0.24  0.20  0.18  0.31  0.36   27 
Table 3: Worker Preferences for Dealing With Workplace Problems 
 
 
Panel B: % who: 
US: 
Want organization with no power but management cooperation 
Want more power but management opposes 






Believes organization effective only if management cooperates 







Want organization to work with management to improve the 
workplace and working conditions 









Sources: US - WRPS; UK - BWRPS        
 
       
Panel A: Percent who prefer to solve problems: 
  with help of fellow employees  by self 
Terms and conditions     
US: Benefits 





UK: Negotiating salary 





Career progression & development      
US:  Training  44  54 
UK: Training/skill development 





Protection     
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Table 4: Percent of Non-members Favouring Different Voice Options in the US and the UK 
 
 
  USA  UK 
Panel A: Distribution of Desire of Non-union Workers  
for Unions, on 0 to 6 Scale 
6 (Highest pro-union answer on all questions)  2  5 
5  8  5 
4  11  8 
3  13  12 
2  21  18 
1  27  26 
0  8  26 
Mean  2.15  1.84 
Panel B: Distribution of Desire of  Union Members for 
Unions, on 0 to 6 Scale 
   
6 (Highest pro-union answer on all questions)  6  15 
5  29  24 
4  37  24 
3  20  20 
2  7  10 
1  1  4 
0  <1  2 
Mean  4.00  3.94 
Panel C: Preferences of Workers in Unionized Workplaces 
For Free Riding Status 
   
% workers  in organized workplaces who do not join union even 
when one is there for workers like them 
-  35 
% of union members who would vote against union   9  - 
% of all non-managerial employees in union workplaces who 
would vote against union  
18  - 
Notes: column percentages.  Sources: WRPS and BWRPS.  See text for construction of variables. 
Unweighted Ns for non-union workers: USA=1,767; UK=889.  Panel B base for USA members in 
unionized workplaces, unweighted N=282.  Panel B base for UK is all union members, unweighted 
N=466. Last row is % of all workers in a union workplace (n=428) who were non-managerial non-
members who would vote against the union.   29 
 
Table 5: Union desire among workers in non-union workplaces 
 
  (1) UK  (2) US  (3) Pooled 
Needs  3.772  2.445  3.041 




     
Opposed  0.628  0.388  0.458 
  (4.00)**  (4.87)**  (6.46)** 
In favour  0.779  0.748  0.757 
  (2.97)**  (3.10)**  (4.38)** 
Count of human 
resource policies 
-0.061  -0.097  -0.070 
  (1.06)  (3.07)**  (2.56)* 
Member  1.164  0.000  1.325 
  (4.38)**  (.)  (5.54)** 
USA dummy      0.339 
      (3.97)** 
Constant  0.651  1.642  1.061 
  (1.32)  (5.93)**  (4.36)** 
Observations  692  1604  2296 
R-squared  0.33  0.17  0.21 
Note : Linear regression models for union desire.  T-statistics in parentheses. See text for 
description of the (0,6) desire for unions scales for the US and the UK. Needs measured as 
described in text.  Human resource policies count gives a score of ‘1’ given every time the 
employee says one of the policies is present at the workplace.  Performance-related pay is not added 
to the count but is contained in the controls. The union effectiveness variable for the UK is an 
additive scale running from zero to eight with a point scored every time the worker rates the union 
A or B on eight dimensions, namely: winning fair pay increases, understanding and knowledge of 
the employers’ business, being open and accountable to members, sharing information they have 
about the employer, promoting equal opportunities, working with management to increase quality 
or productivity, making work interesting and enjoyable, protecting workers against unfair treatment. 
In the USA, the union effectiveness scale runs from 1 to 4 where 1 is ‘not effective at all’ and 4 is 
‘very effective’.  See notes to Table 2 for controls. 
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Table 6:  Estimated Impact of Institutions on Offer on Desire to Unionize and Free Riding 
 
 
  USA  UK 
Actual mean desire for union, non-
members 
2.15  1.84 
USA-UK gap  0.31 
Predicted US mean desire with UK union 
density 
1.95  - 
Predicted UK mean desire with US union 
density 
-  2.23 
Difference in gap explained by model  0.20  0.39 
Notes 
(1) In our sample 34% of UK workers are members compared to 14% in the US. Above simulation uses predicted desire 
for unionisation to ‘simulate’ density in other country. 
(2) Predictions use all worker separate models for the USA and UK.   
(3) The predicted US mean desire with UK density is a prediction for ‘simulated non-members’ in the US having 
eliminated all workers who are in the top 34% of the predicted distribution.  The reasoning is that these top 34% would 
have been union members in the UK. 
(4) The predicted UK mean desire with US union density for ‘simulated non-members’ in the UK having eliminated all 
workers who are in the top 14% of the predicted desire distribution in the UK. The reasoning is that only these top 14% 
of workers would have been union members in USA.   31 
TABLE 7: Union Attitudes Of Workers in the Union Sector 
 
 
  UK  US  UK  US  Pooled 















Union desire (0-6) 
Needs  -0.533  -0.044  1.963  0.134  0.988 




         
Opposed  0.008  -0.071  0.349  0.452  0.403 
  (0.13)  (1.43)  (1.65)  (2.54)*  (3.10)** 
In favor  -0.104  -0.051  0.455  0.247  0.315 
  (2.77)**  (0.68)  (3.51)**  (0.93)  (2.97)** 




-0.014  -0.015  0.033  0.036  0.028 




-0.040  -0.081  0.243  0.110  0.184 
  (5.99)**  (2.98)**  (10.42)**  (1.13)  (9.09)** 
UK union 
member 
        1.365 
          (11.45)** 
USA dummy    -      1.530 
    -      (9.92)** 
Constant  0.861  0.507  0.250  3.572  0.325 
  (5.86)**  (2.67)**  (0.49)  (5.28)**  (0.91) 
Observations  663  277  663  277  940 
R-squared  0.30  0.25  0.33  0.24  0.38 
 
Note : See notes to Tables 2 and 5 for controls. Dependent variables are as follows.  Column 1: union non-membership.  
Column 2:  responding ‘get rid of the union’ in response to the question: “If a new election were held TODAY to decide 
whether to keep the union at your (company/organization), would you vote to keep the union or get rid of it?” Columns 
3-5: desire for union on the (0,6) scale described in the text. Populations are as follows.  Columns 1 and 3: all UK 
workers in unionised workplaces. Columns 2 and 4: US members in unionized workplaces.  Column3: all US workers 
in unionised workplaces.  Column 5: all UK workers in union workplaces and US members in union workplaces. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Non-union Worker Likely to Vote For/Against Unions in NLRB Election,  













1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Year 
% 
If an election were held tomorrow to decide whether your workplace would have a union or not, do you think you would  
definitely vote for forming a union, probably vote for forming a union, probably vote against forming a union, or definitely  
vote against forming a union?  
Definitely or probably vote 
for forming a union 
Definitely or probably vote 
against forming a union 
 
Source: Hart Research Associates, various polls, except 1984, when data are from Harris, for question: “If an election 
were held tomorrow to decide whether your workplace would be unionized or not, do you think you would definitely 
vote for a union, probably vote for a union, probably vote against a union, or definitely vote against a union?” 
 




















WERS BSAS CPS MORG
 
 
Notes: For Britain, figures are % non-members in workplaces recognizing unions for pay bargaining.  WERS data 
adapted from Millward et al. (2000: 142).  Establishments with 25+ employees where one or more unions recognized 
for pay bargaining and where number of members reported.  Figures based on surveys in 1980 (full-time employees 
only), 1984, 1990 and 1998.  BSAS adapted from Bryson and Gomez (2005, Table 8).  Employees working 10+ hours 
per week.  Figures based on surveys in all years between 1983 and 2001 except 1988 and 1992. For the USA, figures 
are % of covered workers who are non-members.  Figures based on annual MORG Outgoing Rotation Files, 1983-2005   33 
Figure 3: Distribution of Workplace Needs 
 
















0 5 10 15 20
Number of workplace needs, BWRPS
  















0 5 10 15























0 5 10 15
Number of workplace needs in US
   34 
Appendix A: The Data sets 
 UK:  The Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998  
The Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) is a nationally representative survey 
of workplaces with 10 or more employees covering all sectors of the economy except agriculture, 
fishing, mining and quarrying, private households, and extra-territorial organizations.  The analyses 
use two elements of the survey.  The first is the management interview, conducted face-to-face with 
the most senior workplace manager responsible for employee relations.  Interviews were conducted 
in 2191 workplaces with a response rate of 80 per cent.  The second element is the survey of 
employees within workplaces where a management interview was obtained.  Self-completion 
questionnaires were distributed to a simple random sample of 25 employees (or all employees in 
workplaces with 10-24) in the 1880 cases where management permitted it.
25  Of the 44,283 
questionnaires distributed, 28,237 (64 per cent) usable ones were returned.
26   
 
UK:  British Worker Representation and Participation Survey (BWRPS) 2001  
The BWRPS was conducted as part of the monthly BMRB Access Omnibus survey.  Interviews 
were conducted using face-to-face computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) techniques. In 
total, some 3614 interviews were conducted as part of the Omnibus survey.  Of these 1,355 people 
were eligible to take part in the BWRPS. The weighting schema used in this analysis ensures that 
demographic profiles match those for all employees in Great Britain aged 15 or over. 
 
US: Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) 1994-1995  
The WRPS was based on telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of 2,408 
adults, 18 and over, who were employed in private companies or nonprofit organizations in the 
continental US with 25 or more employees. 
 
US: Peter Hart Opinion Poll Data  
Peter D. Hart Research Associates has conducted random telephone calls for the AFL-CIO on 
worker attitudes toward unions and economic issues. It has used the same question about voting for 
a union in all of its surveys, which gives it the best time series of worker preferences available. 
                                                            
25 The probability of worker selection is the product of the probability of the workplace being selected and the 
probability of an employee being selected from within that workplace. 
26 The weighting scheme compensates for sample non-response bias detected in the employee survey (Airey et al., 
1999: 91-92).   35 
Appendix B: Needs Scales 
 
There are a variety of ways in which one might wish to construct an index of the ‘needs’ or 
‘problems’ workers face at the workplace.  Traditionally, analysts have contented themselves with a 
single measure, such as an overall job satisfaction measure or perception of the climate of 
employment relations.  However, single measures suffer from a number of drawbacks.  First, any 
single item will only capture a part of an underlying multi-dimensional concept such as ‘needs’ or 
‘problems’ at work.  Measuring such a concept across various dimensions helps reduce the degree 
to which a proxy for needs suffers from this type of measurement error.  Second, there is no reason, 
a priori, why one should give precedence to one facet of workplace needs or problems.  Third, 
particular needs or problems fall or rise in salience depending on external factors, such as the point 
in the business cycle.  For instance, workers may be less likely to cite problems with pay 
satisfaction when the labor market is tight and employers are having to meet fairly large wage 
demands to attract and retain workers.  A multi-item index can ‘smooth’ such problems so giving a 
potentially more accurate measure of changes in needs over time.  Another big advantage of a 
multi-item scale scored as a fraction of the total possible number of problems or needs recorded is 
that it offers a possibility of making comparisons across surveys where the specific survey questions 
are not identical. 
 
Having chosen a multi-item scale, one needs to consider what enters the scale and how items should 
be added together.  We were constrained in the items available to us since the surveys had already 
been undertaken.  Fortunately those for both the USA and the UK contained items relating to key 
domains, notably the climate at the workplace, ‘gaps’ in influence between what workers had and 
what they wanted, satisfaction with various aspects of their jobs, ratings of management, and so on.  
We chose to record a need or problem each time a respondent expressed one. As indicated in the 
text, results were not sensitive to whether we used the full distribution of answers to a particular 
item, or simply entered it as a dummy (0,1) variable where 1=a problem or need.  One might 
consider giving greater weight to some items than others in an additive scale, but there were no a 
priori reasons for doing so.  Inter-item correlations were generally positive suggesting adding items 
together was not an unreasonable strategy.  The Cronbach alpha for all items in the BWRPS was 
.80, while the alpha for those in WRPS was .64. 
 
There are difficulties running principal components analyses on the items entering the scales 
because, as explained in the text, some questions were randomly assigned to sub-samples.  
Consequently, whereas one can readily add up scores to similar questions to form a scale, principal 
components analyses would have to be run on the sub-samples asked the same set of questions. 
 
To test the effect of a single item measure relative to the needs scale we took measures of 
employment relations climate in the UK and the US.  We reran Table 5 columns 1 and 2 replacing 
the needs fraction with measures of climate.  In the case of the UK, we used responses to the 
question: ‘how would you rate relations between employees and management at your workplace?’ 
with highest score being ‘excellent’ then ‘good’, ‘only fair’ then ‘poor’.  Scoring ‘poor’ as the 
highest and ‘good’ as the lowest, the coefficient was 0.52 with a t-stat of 6.38.  Whilst strong this 
coefficient compares to 3.77 (t=9.42) for needs.  For US non-union workers we used responses to 
the question ‘do you think relations between employees and management at your organization are 
better than average, worse than average or about the same as in other places?’, coding ‘worse’ as 1 
otherwise zero.  Again, while strong (0.67, t=5.04) it compares to a coefficient of 2.45 at t=9.31 for 
needs.  On the basis of this test, the needs effects are much larger than those of single items.  36 
The needs scales were constructed using the following items: 
 
BWRPS, 2001 needs scale, 0 to 23  WRPS, 1995 needs scale, 0 to 13  WERS, 1998 needs scale, 0 
to 13 
-  Workers paid unfair wages 
-  Workers dismissed/disciplined 
unfairly 
-  Bullying by management/fellow 
workers 
-  Sexual or racial discrimination 
-  Preferential treatment by management 
-  Have witnessed or experienced unfair 
treatment at current workplace 
-  Disagree managers understanding 
about having to meet family 
responsibilities 
-  Disagree people encouraged to 
develop skills 
-  Management poor at giving fair pay 
increases 
-  Management poor at making work 
enjoyable 
-  Management poor at willingness to 
share power 
-  Management poor at concern for 
employees 
-  Management poor at keeping 
everyone up to date with proposed 
changes 
-  Management poor at understanding 
and knowledge of the business 
-  Management poor at promoting equal 
ops 
-  do not trust employer to keep 
promises at all 
-  disagree that ‘my job is secure’ 
-  disagree that ‘my job is interesting and 
enjoyable’ 
-  ‘relations between employees and 
management’ are ‘poor’ 
-  not satisfied with influence in 
company decisions affecting you 
-  1 point every time a person views 
having a lot of influence as ‘very 
important’ but does not have a lot of 
influence up to a maximum of 3 
- don’t trust management ‘at all’ to 
keep promises 
- relations between employees and 
management poor 
- relations between employees and 
management worse than average 
- not at all satisfied with influence in 
company decisions affecting job or 
work life 
- not at all likely to get influence you 
want if you tried 
- management never take 
suggestions seriously 
- have held back from making 
suggestions about how to work more 
efficiently through fear of own or 
someone else’s job 
- company system for resolving 
problems of individual employees is 
‘not effective at all’ 
- ‘town’ meetings not effective at all 
in resolving group problems 
- open door policy not effective at 
all in resolving group problems 
- employee committee not effective 
at all in resolving group problems 
- 1 point every time a person views 
having a lot of influence as ‘very 
important’ but does not have a lot of 
influence up to a maximum of 4 or 
(depending on random routing) 1 
point every time a person is not 
satisfied with influence on these 
items 
 
-       job insecure 
-  dissatisfied with 
influence over job 
-  dissatisfied with pay 
-  dissatisfied with sense 
of achievement 
-  dissatisfied with  respect 
from supervisors 
-  disagree ‘managers 
understanding about 
having to meet family 
responsibilities 
-  disagree people 
encouraged to develop 
skills 
-  management  poor at 
keeping everyone up to 
date about proposed 
changes 
-  management poor on 
providing everyone with 
the chance to comment 
on proposed changes’ 
-  management poor in 
responding to 
suggestions 
-  management poor 
dealing with work 
problems 
-  management poor at 
‘treating employees 
fairly’ 
-  relations between 
management and 
employees poor or very 
poor 
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Appendix C: desire for union representation (0,6) among non-members by needs 
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Controls are as per notes in Table 2 plus the count of HRM practices and the USA dummy in the pooled 
regression 
 
Appendix D: desire for union representation (0,3) among non-members in non-unionised 
workplaces, WERS, linear estimation 
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Notes: (1) controls common to both models: female, age (6 dummies), ethnicity, health problems, marital status, 
qualifications (7 dummies), occupation (9 dummies), workplace tenure (4 dummies), hours (5 dummies), gender 
segregation in the job at the workplace (5 dummies), banded wages (11 dummies), permanent contract.  Additional 
controls in model (1) which excludes fixed effects: region (11 dummies), local area unemployment, establishment size, 
independent single establishment, industry (12 dummies), workplace age, foreign owned, % female no part-timers, no 
ethnic minorities. (2) The count of HR policies runs from 0 to 6 with a point scored every time the following are 
present: regular meetings between senior management and the whole workforce; team briefings involving two-way 
communication; quality circles; grievance procedure; joint consultative committee; HR specialist.  The count of variable 
pay schemes runs from 0 to 4 with a point scored every time the following are present: profit-related pay, ESOPs, 
performance-related pay, cash bonuses. 
 